BOMBARDMENT ON THE MORRO CASTLE, 1 JULY 1762

By Richard Paton, mid-18th century

(Highest resolution available 4500×3340)

In 1761 Spain entered the war, and Britain immediately planned operations against her colonies. An amphibious assault on Havana, the most significant Spanish settlement in the Americas, with a naval base, a dockyard producing quality ships made of tropical hardwood and a permanent squadron of warships, was settled upon. Havana was a formidable target defended by the Morro Castle, and three British warships, the 80-gun Cambridge, the 70-gun Marlborough and the 74-gun Dragon were sent to attack it in an action shown in this painting. Currents near shore always run fast and to attack a static, heavily defended shore battery from the unpredictable and shifting element of the sea was always difficult. On this occasion the guns of the Morro Castle were well manned and well aimed and the British ships were badly mauled and forced to retreat. A further attack had been landed upstream of the castle. The walls were breached and the castle taken by storm, but not before time. Thousands of British sailors and soldiers died from tropical disease. At the close of the war Havana was restored to Spain, but in return the island of Minorca, so crucial to British interests and so easily thrown away by Byng at the start of the war, was returned to Britain.

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FRENCH FIRE RAFTS ATTACKING THE ENGLISH FLEET OFF QUÉBEC, 28 JUNE 1759

By Samuel Scott, 1767

(Highest resolution available 6342×3048)

Only two days after the British force arrived, the French launched a fireship attack in a concerted effort to drive the enemy ships away before they could land the army, but Admiral Saunders was forewarned and prepared. His ships’ boats were manned and the fireships were towed to safety before they could inflict any damage. Wolfe’s troops were soon landed and, after a hazardous operation, in which both Wolfe and the French general the Marquis de Montcalm, died, Québec fell. Within a year Canada was in British hands.

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JAMES COOK’S CHART OF THE ST LAWRENCE TO QUÉBEC BY ORDER OF VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES SAUNDERS 1759, fragment above, full chart below

Published by Thomas Jefferys

(Highest resolution available 5640×973)

While the British were enjoying significant success in European waters, the war in Canada had also taken a significant turn. Assaults on French Montréal and Québec were both planned and crucial to the success of both was the navigation of a huge British fleet transporting Major General James Wolfe’s land forces up the St Lawrence River. This was quite a challenge: the navy had no charts of the St Lawrence, which is protected by a number of navigational hazards, and the French in Québec felt quite safe. Aboard the frigate Mercury however was a talented young navigator with an interest in hydrographic surveying named James Cook. In a short time he and a number of other officers had produced a sufficiently accurate and detailed chart of the St Lawrence to allow the entire fleet far enough upriver for Wolfe’s army to be landed to attack Québec. It was the start of a glittering career for the young Cook.

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THE CAPTURE OF THE FOUDROYANT BY HMS MONMOUTH, 28 FEBRUARY 1758
By Francis Swaine, mid-18th century
(Highest resolution available 6480×5046)

Hawke’s victory was all the more remarkable because he attacked as night fell. Night-time actions were exceptionally dangerous. It was difficult enough to maneuver fleets of ships without collision in daylight and in calm weather, but at night and in a storm it was all but impossible. Ships would hang lanterns in their rigging and off the stern, but distance remained almost impossible to judge. It is not insignificant that, just prior to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, a squadron of British ships attacked and captured the Foudroyant at night, the subject of this painting. British seamanship had reached a level where night-time attack was possible. The officers were sufficiently confident in their own seamanship and perhaps more importantly, in the seamanship of their colleagues, to risk such an attack. Because it was a risky tactic it was unexpected, and because it was unexpected it was particularly effective.

To help officers see at night, ‘night telescopes’ had been invented but the earliest models had a significant flaw. In normal daytime telescopes additional lenses flipped the inverted image the right way round. However, these led to a loss of light and were removed from night telescopes with the result that at night the captain might be able to see his enemy from a long way off, but the image would be upside down.

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THE BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY, 21 NOVEMBER 1759: THE DAY AFTER

By Richard Wright, 1760

(Highest resolution available 5397×4519)

With considerable expense and effort the blockading British fleet commanded by Admiral Edward Hawke (1705-1781) remained healthy. The French had not left Brest for three full years. Their courageous commander Comte de Conflans could not bear such idleness any longer. He devised a plan of attacking a small British squadron blockading the transports at Morbihan and got a permission to execute it. On November 14^th as Hawke’s ships were blown off station by the foul weather, the French fleet escaped the blockade and left Brest. Hawke chased and caught up with it by the sunset. Surprised to see Hawke approaching Comte de Conflans sought shelter in Quiberon Bay, which was guarded by uncharted rocks and hidden shoals. There he believed Hawke would not follow him given the stormy weather and night coming. Hawke, however, did not want to miss the French again and followed their every move.

A chaotic and fierce engagement began. In heavy seas ships rolled, pitched and heaved in the swell so that there was real danger of flooding through the gunports. The biggest ships had 50 such two foot square holes on each side with the lowest only three feet above the waterline. Therefore, it did not take much of a swell or a particularly strong wind to endanger the ship. In the middle of the battle a strong gust of wind blew the French 74-gun Thésée flat. Water poured into her gunports and she sank with appalling loss of life. Not long after, the French 70-gun Superbe sank after only two broadside from Hawke’s flagship, an extremely unusual occurrence as gunfire rarely caused a ship to sink. All 800 of her men were lost and more carnage followed in the aftermath of the battle, the subject of this painting. Two French ships were driven ashore and burned, two more were wrecked. Two British ships were also wrecked, but their crews saved. The British Resolution lies wrecked in the foreground, the captured French Formidable is shown with a British ship to the left. Conflans’s ship the Soleil-Royale, and the French Héros burn in the background. Hawke’s ship, the 100-gun Royal George, lies broadside-to at anchor in the centre on the painting. The French lost six ships and 2500 men in the battle. Their plans for invasion were abandoned.

Royal Navy page on the battle

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RETURN OF A FLEET INTO PLYMOUTH HARBOUR

By Dominic Serres the Elder, 1766

(Highest resolution available 4102×2439)

The recruited sailors had to be kept healthy. The circumstances required British ships to spend long periods of time at sea and in 1759 this problem was especially difficult. The French were planning an invasion of England and gathered their armies and transport craft at a wide and safe anchorage called the Morbihan. To start the invasion the French men-of-war  had to sail from the nearby Brest to Morbihan to collect the troops and escort the transport to the English shores. For the British it was critical to keep the French fleet on check and prevent it leaving Brest. Therefore a close and continuous watch was required. This meant that a fleet of 14,000 men had to be kept healthy at sea for weeks or even months in the western part of the Channel. Such a blockade was made possible by the existence of Plymouth dockyards, where damaged ships could return for running repairs. Also food, fresh water and other supplies could be easily sent to the blockading fleet. With Brest being the main target, Plymouth grew both in size and importance.

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THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG, 14 MARCH 1757

Anonymous, c.1760

(Highest resolution available 3538×1885)

A heavily publicized trial followed and Byng was found guilty of ‘failing to do his utmost to take or capture the enemy ships’ and in an extraordinary example of self-inflicted bloodletting, he was executed by his own marines on his own quarterdeck. A midday on 14 March 1757 he was led to the quarterdeck of the Monarque, berthed in Portsmouth harbor. There he knelt on a cushion and tied one white handkerchief around his eyes and held the other in his hand. He had requested that the marines fire when he dropped the handkerchief, the moment depicted in the painting. The two men in tears to the right of Byng are believed to be his close friends. On is his secretary, George Lawrence, to whom Byng had given his watch moments before. All accounts agree that Byng died with exceptional bravery, but there was no professional sympathy for his actions at the Battle of Minorca.

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PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MINORCA, 1756

(Highest available definition 6254×4576)

First blood in the Seven Years War came at the battle of Minorca in 1756. Vice Admiral John Byng was sent to the Mediterranean to reinforce British-held Minorca against a possible French attack. The French landed 12,000 troops in mid April and began a lengthy siege, entirely dependent on sea-borne supply protected by the French fleet under Vice Admiral La Galissonière. Byng’s fleet of 13 ships gave him a slight advantage over La Galissonière’s 12, but the French easily repulsed Byng’s attack. As the British bore down the French crippled them by targeting the masts and rigging before drifting away to leeward, re-forming and repeating the whole process. Byng repaired his damaged ships but made no further move to lift the siege of Minorca which fell soon after. The loss of Minorca deprived the British of a crucial base in the heart of the Mediterranean from where they had been able to watch or attack the French fleet at Toulon.

References to the Plan

Position of the English and French Fleets at about half an hour after the afternoon of 20^th of May 1756.

When the French Fleet began the Engagement.

1. French Line going with the Wind upon the Beam and Main topsails to the Mast, the 4^th and 5^th. Ships began the Fire and very soon it became General.
2. French Frigates to Windward.
3. English Line, the Van not yet fairly up to their respective Adversaries and consequently not the Rear, as the Angle after Tacking must be greater in the Rear, than the Van, yet all but the two Sternmost were even now within the Gun-Shot.
4. The Intrepide putting right down out of the headmost Ships way by which in bringing up She was immediately disabled.
5. The Adm. With the Signal out to Engage the Enemy returning their Fire which he had received from the 3 Ships for a considerable time going down without answering it as not thinking himself near enough.
6. Deptford ordered out of the Line.
7. G. Phoenix with the Scooner to attend her in case of burning to receive her People.
8. Chesterfield
9. I. The Experiment and Dolphin

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